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INTRODUCTION
The potential impact of public capital on private sector productivity has attracted 
much attention recently [Gramlich, 1994]. With U.S. data, Figure 1 illustrates the 
issue. It shows ﬁ  ve-year centered moving averages of total factor productivity growth 
in manufacturing and of labor productivity growth in the nonfarm business sector in 
combination with annual changes in the stock of public capital. From the mid 1960s to 
the early 1980s, the gradual decline in total factor productivity and labor productivity 
growth rates was accompanied by a steady decrease in the growth in public capital. 
It seems therefore that the decrease in public capital growth is a candidate explana-
tion for the decline in productivity growth that occurred in the 1970s. As Figure 1 
also illustrates, however, it is much less clear whether ﬂ  uctuations in the provision 
of public capital can account for the variation in productivity growth in the 1980s and 
1990s: productivity growth has improved on a more consistent basis in the late 1990s, 
whereas, after dropping off even in the late 1960s, the growth in the public capital 
stock never really recovered. 
Early econometric research [Ratner, 1983; Ram and Ramsey, 1989; Aschauer, 1989; 
Munnell, 1990] used time series data in a production function framework and found 
that public capital indeed contributed signiﬁ  cantly to the decline of private produc-
tivity. Other researchers developed either proﬁ  t function [Deno, 1988; Demetriades 
and Mamuneas, 2000] or cost function [Lynde and Richmond, 1992; Morrison and 
Schwartz, 1996; Rovolis and Spence, 2002] models and came to the same conclusion.1 
Vijverberg, Vijverberg and Gamble [1997] used all three approaches but could not ﬁ  nd 
any consistent productivity effect between them. The discrepancy between the ﬁ  nd-
ings may result from using time series of a different length (as well as implementing 
models in different ways): as is clear from Figure 1, a study that uses data up to the 208 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
early 1980s is more likely to ﬁ  nd a positive contribution than one that extends the 
time series into the 1990s.
 FIGURE  1
  Annual Growth Rates in Total Factor Productivity TFP, 
  Labor Productivity Q/L and Public Capital G
Note: TFP pertains to manufacturing, Q/L pertains to the nonfarm business sector, and G in-
cludes federal and state public capital. Growth rates in TFP and Q/L are presented by means of 
ﬁ  ve-year centered moving averages.
In order to deal with the nonstationarity problem in time series variables, some 
studies used differenced variables in either time series [Tatom, 1991; Sturm and De 
Haan, 1995] or panel data [Garcia-Mila, McGuire and Porter, 1996]. These differenced 
variable models refuted the notion that public capital contributed to private sector 
productivity. However, some [Lynde and Richmond, 1993] estimated share equations 
in a proﬁ  t function with consideration of nonstationarity in the time series data and 
found that public capital did contribute to private productivity. In all these studies, 
the focus is on either the whole private sector or the manufacturing sector.
These results have not been of much use to policy makers. Should they propose 
more investment in public capital? What is the rate of return?2 Will it substitute for 
durable goods that the private sector would otherwise purchase itself? In the light of 
these questions, this paper reexamines the signiﬁ  cance of public capital for the activ-
ity in the private sector and adds an analysis of its two major subsectors, namely, the 
manufacturing and service sectors. The underlying question is whether the productiv-
ity effect is concentrated in only one subsector. We utilize both cost function and proﬁ  t 
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have given inadequate attention to. First, in these macroeconomic models one can 
hardly maintain the assumption that prices are exogenous. We employ instruments 
in order to account for the endogeneity of prices. Second, there are strong indications 
that most variables in the model are nonstationary. This raises questions about the 
statistical validity of the estimates. We generate diagnostics on the cost and proﬁ  t 
models for each sector for both observed and instrumented prices; we also estimate 
these models with differenced data, although that is generally not a preferred method 
for dealing with nonstationarity. In the multiplicity of these diagnostics, we reconsider 
the impact of public capital.
With the various models we try to answer the following questions. How large is the 
marginal product of public capital? If public capital matters in private sector produc-
tion, does it derive its impact mainly from the manufacturing or the service sector? 
Are results robust: do proﬁ  t function and cost function approaches provide mutually 
consistent results? How soon will public capital investments raise labor productiv-
ity? Is public capital a substitute for or a complement of private capital and labor? 
Finally, do production functions exhibit constant returns to scale in the use of private 
and public capital [Barro, 1990; Rebelo, 1991]? Answers to these questions are valu-
able as one could argue that a sector beneﬁ  ting more from public capital investments 
should contribute more to the payment for these investments—or be eligible for a less 
generous subsidy package to entice corporate relocation. Estimates of the elasticity of 
substitution are useful in predicting the impact of public capital investment on private 
investment and labor demand. Summarizing the many empirical results with a single 
statement, returns to investments in public capital appear to be sizable but cannot 
be estimated with precision due to the characteristics of the data.
The next section brieﬂ  y outlines the theoretical models. The section after that 
describes the data and addresses estimation issues. The following section is the core 
of the paper, presenting various diagnostics of the relationships. Productivity effects 
and elasticities of substitution are reported in the next section. The ﬁ  nal section 
concludes.
THEORETICAL MODELS
We examine the impact of public capital on private productivity with two differ-
ent models: the cost function model and the proﬁ  t function model. These models are 
based on the following production relationship:
(1)  (, , ,) QF L K G t =
where Q is output, produced with inputs L (labor), K (capital), and G (public capi-
tal), which we shall decompose into federal (Gf) and state (Gs) capital in most of our 
discussion.3 The variable t represents the level of technology. pI denotes the price of 
I for I = Q, L, K.
The change in labor productivity is computed by differentiating (1) totally with 
respect to Q, K, L, G and t, and then rearranging terms. Thus, ﬁ  rst we have210 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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Thus, the proportional change in labor productivity is decomposed into four terms, 
related to the change in the capital/labor ratio, the size of the workforce, the provision 
of public capital, and a secular time trend. As indicated in equation (3), for simplic-
ity of notation, ΔI denotes the impact of I on the change in labor productivity, with 
I = K/L, L, G, t. Let us also deﬁ  ne ΔMFP = ΔG + Δt as multifactor productivity growth. 
The exact form of the expressions depends on whether the cost or proﬁ  t function is 
used; see below. Note that the labor force effect ΔL vanishes whenever the production 
process exhibits constant returns to scale with respect to L and K.
The Cost Function Model
Let us deﬁ  ne cost as [Lynde and Richmond, 1992; Morrison and Schwartz, 1996]: 
C = pLL + pKK. With competitive input markets and cost-minimizing behavior, C is 
expressed as
(4)  () ,, , , LK CC ppQ G t =
Owing to cost minimization, we have ∂C/∂pI = I, for I = L,K. Deﬁ  ne the cost share 
of input I as σI = pI I/C, which, again because of cost-minimizing behavior, can also 
be expressed as σI = ∂lnC/∂lnpI. Then, σL +  σK = 1. Furthermore, in competitive output 
markets, ∂C/∂Q equals pQ, which implies that the “output share” σQ = pQQ/C equals 
∂ln C /∂ln Q.
Assumptions of competitive output markets and cost-minimization yield 
∂C/∂G=−pQFG,4 and ∂C/∂t = −pQFt and, of course, pQFI = pI for I = L,K. Together with 
the deﬁ  nitions of σG = ∂ln C/∂ln G and σt = ∂ln C/∂t, we are able to rewrite Equation 
(3)  describing the change in labor productivity in terms of σ-shares:
(5) 
1 Q Gt K
QQ Q Q
dQ dL dK dL dL dG
dt
QL KL L G
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For estimation, we specify a translog cost equation (fully quadratic in logs and 
time trend, however, without [ln G]2and t[ln G] to avoid extreme multicollinearity) 
and derive the labor share, capital share and output share equations from it, us-211 PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC CAPTIAL
ing the information that the labor and capital shares sum to 1. To be precise, let 
















where βL and βQ are the elements of the vector β that are associated with ln pL - ln pK 
and ln Q in the vector x, and where ΓL. and ΓQ. are similarly corresponding rows of the 
symmetric matrix Γ.5 For internal consistency of the model, we impose the implied 
cross-equation parameters restrictions.6 Given additive disturbance terms, the three 
equations in (6) are estimated jointly, allowing for a full covariance matrix as well as 
ﬁ  rst-order serial correlation (within each equation, not across equations).
The Proﬁ  t Function Model
Proﬁ  t is deﬁ  ned as [Deno, 1988; Lynde and Richmond, 1993]  Π = pQ Q − pL L − pK K. 
Assuming that input and output markets are competitive and that ﬁ  rms maximize 
proﬁ  ts, Π can also be expressed as
(7)  () ,,, , QLK pppG t Π=Π
where, under the stated assumptions, ∂Π/∂PQ = Q, and ∂Π/∂pI = −I for I = L,K. Moreover, 
as increases in G and t do not contribute to costs, we have ∂Π/∂G = pQFG, and ∂Π/∂t = 
pQFt. Let us then deﬁ  ne “proﬁ  t ratios” as sI ≡ pI  I/Π for I = Q, L, K. These quantities are 
measurable with the economic data we utilize later on and, under the stated conditions, 
relate to the proﬁ  t function as sQ = ∂ln Π/ ∂ln pQ, −sI = ∂ln Π/ ∂ln pI for I = L, K. Moreover, 
since proﬁ  t equals revenue minus costs, we have sQ − sL − sK = 1. Finally, deﬁ  ning sG = 
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We specify a translog function, again without [ln G]2and t[ln G]. From this, we 
derive equations for sQ and sL, once again using information about the restriction on 
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Here, z = (ln pL− ln pK  ln pQ − ln pK  ln G  t). κ is a parameter vector, elements of 
which are used in the two share equations, and Λ is a symmetric matrix with ΛGG = 
ΛGt = ΛtG = 0. We assume additive disturbance terms with a full covariance matrix, 
subject to ﬁ  rst-order serial correlation within each equation; the serial correlation 
coefﬁ  cients for the sQ and −sL equations are restricted to be the same, in view of the 
adding-up constraint [Berndt and Savin, 1975]. For internal consistency of the model, 
cross-equation parameter restrictions are imposed.
DATA AND ESTIMATION ISSUES
The Data
The data consist of annual time series for the nonﬁ  nancial corporate sector (which 
we shall refer to as the “nfc private” sector) from 1959 to 2000, manufacturing sector 
from 1959 to 2000, and service sector from 1965 to 20007 in the United States. The 
manufacturing sector includes both durable and nondurable goods. The service sec-
tor, as we deﬁ  ne it for this paper, contains wholesale and retail trade, and services 
(as deﬁ  ned as such in our sources). We speciﬁ  cally omit the subsectors of ﬁ  nance, 
insurance, and real estate, which, in most other discussions, are typically included 
in the deﬁ  nition of the service sector. We found that these subsectors employ around 
ten percent of the workers of the overall aggregate but utilize nearly seventy percent 
of the nonresidential capital: in particular, real estate services are capital-intensive. 
This suggests heterogeneity in the service sector: it is better to drop real estate. Un-
fortunately, information on labor in real estate services is not separated from that in 
ﬁ  nance and insurance services.
Public capital (G) refers to net stock of (nonmilitary) equipment and structures in 
the hands of federal (denoted as (Gf) and state and local (Gs) government, with G=Gf+Gs. 
Detailed information about deﬁ  nitions and sources is given in Appendix A.
While we analyze both the total and the sectoral impact of public capital, it should 
be noted that the sector deﬁ  nitions imply some slippage. Speciﬁ  cally, the nonﬁ  nancial 
corporate private sector extends beyond manufacturing and service activities, and the 
manufacturing and service sectors include noncorporate private business activity. 
Nevertheless, we choose to work with these private sector data for two reasons: (i) 
a shorter series (1959-1989) of these nfc private sector data have been used in other 
studies [Lynde and Richmond, 1992; 1993; Vijverberg, Vijverberg and Gamble, 1997], 
so that there is a strong link of comparison with previous research; and (ii) for the 
nfc private sector, labor and output data come from the same source, (implying data 
consistency), whereas sectoral data derive from several sources and sectoral labor 
speciﬁ  cally excludes supervisory personnel. But while there are differences, there is 
also much overlap.8 Therefore, acknowledging that it is desirable but extremely difﬁ  cult 
to develop sectorally consistent data for all variables of all subsectors, we conclude 
that a study of our three samples contributes to an understanding of the source of the 
productivity effect, if any, of public capital in the private sector.213 PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC CAPTIAL
Estimation Issues
Under the cost and proﬁ  t approaches, the empirical model consists of a system of 
three equations, two of which are share/ratio equations. These three equations are 
estimated jointly using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) technique, 
allowing for a full covariance matrix as well as ﬁ  rst-order serial correlation.
To examine robustness of the model, we estimate the models with aggregated 
as well as disaggregated public capital and with measured (or observed) as well as 
instrumented price variables. Given the size of the sectors in the overall economy, 
one might argue that price variables cannot be taken as exogenous.9 To create the 
instrumented price variables, we use the following instruments: the federal funds rate, 
Romer dates [Romer and Romer, 1990; 1994], real defense spending, lagged private 
capital stock and labor force, and real exports, and lags of several of these. The ﬁ  rst 
two of these represent the impact of government monetary policy; defense spending 
is driven by political cycles; the lagged values are predetermined factors impacting 
the current economy; and the demand for U.S. exports originates from conditions 
abroad. The instrumental equations have R2-values ranging from 0.933 to 0.998, 
with the ln(pk) variable being the hardest to predict well.10 Further tests soundly 
reject any presence of unit roots in the residuals of the instrumental equations and 
thus indicate the existence of cointegrating relationships. It should be noted that 
the IV approach to the cost and proﬁ  t function models has desirable properties only 
asymptotically and that the results for samples as small as those used here must be 
interpreted with some caution.
DIAGNOSTICS
We evaluate the inﬂ  uence of public capital on private sector productivity from three 
different angles. First, because of the threat that nonstationarity in the data poses 
to the quality of the parameter estimates, all variables in each model are tested for 
nonstationarity: the logarithm of prices in each sector, the logarithm of public capital, 
the labor and output shares and ratios, and the logarithm of cost and proﬁ  t. Three 
separate tests are used to determine the existence of nonstationarity: the Zρ and Zt 
tests of Phillips and Ouliaris [1990], and the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test 
as modiﬁ  ed by Elliott, Rothenberg and Stock [1996] with a lag selected according to 
the Schwarz information criterion. The ﬁ  rst two tests indicate nonstationarity for all 
variables with the possible exception of lnG and lnGs and, for the nfc private sector 
data, the ratio variables sL and sQ.11 The modiﬁ  ed ADF test also indicates stationar-
ity for ln Π in the nfc private sector and in manufacturing, and for sL and sQ in the 
service industry.
Concerns of possible spurious regression results thus arise. We therefore test the 
residuals of all models in all three sectors for nonstationarity by means of the Elliott-
Rothenberg-Stock [1996] and the Phillips-Ouliaris [1990] Zρ and Zt tests, evaluated 
with critical values that are simulated for each given sample size since asymptotic 
critical values may be seriously misleading when applied to ﬁ  nite samples [Davidson 214 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
and MacKinnon, 1993, 721]. It turns out that, for all cases except the nfc private 
sector, the hypothesis that residuals are nonstationary cannot be rejected even at 
the 10 percent signiﬁ  cance level, raising doubts as to whether the models capture 
production relationships in the data. However, should this result be taken at face 
value? First, there is much debate about the power of most tests in distinguishing 
between unit root and stationary processes in ﬁ  nite-sample observations [Hamilton, 
1994, 444-446]. This is particularly true when the sample is small, as it is here. For 
example, by means of a simulation we found that in a case where disturbances were 
actually stationary and followed an AR(1) process with a correlation coefﬁ  cient of 0.5, 
the probability of concluding in favor of cointegration would be only about one third: 
the power of the test for cointegration is low indeed. Moreover, the autocorrelation 
and partial autocorrelation functions of the residuals of the cost and proﬁ  t function 
models indicate cases where mild serial correlation is evident but a unit root is highly 
implausible.12 Second, here is a case where the econometric test statistics, though 
sophisticated in themselves, are primitive in comparison to the microeconometric 
cost and proﬁ  t function model. The test statistics used here are supposed to apply to 
residuals of a linear OLS model with unit root variables; our microeconometric model 
consists of a set of interrelated equations with cross-equation parameter restrictions, 
is estimated with FIML, and contains squared values of variables that have unit roots. 
For such a model, suitable econometric test statistics do not exist. For these reasons, 
the apparent outcome of the cointegration tests cannot be considered conclusive.13 
We must probe further.
The second diagnostic is the likelihood ratio test that veriﬁ  es the signiﬁ  cance 
of public capital in the model. Removing public capital from the entire model yields 
likelihood ratio test statistics reported in Table 1, panel A; these are to be compared 
against the critical value χ
09 5
2 37 8 1
. . () = for the aggregate public capital model and 
χ
09 5
2 61 2 5 9
. . () = for the disaggregate public capital model, under the presumption 
that the ﬁ  nite-sample likelihood ratio statistic has a distribution approximating the 
asymptotic χ2−distribution. The likelihood ratio tests indicate that public capital is a 
signiﬁ  cant factor in cost function models in all three sectors and in the proﬁ  t function 
model in the nfc private sector.14
The last diagnostic of the impact of public capital on the private sector is its esti-
mated return, which indicates the economic signiﬁ  cance of public capital’s contribu-
tion. This return is computed as the marginal product of G, i.e., FG according to the 
production function speciﬁ  ed in equation (1), where both G and Q are speciﬁ  ed in real 
terms – see also Appendix C. FG indicates the increase in annual private sector pro-
duction in billions of dollars when the stock of public capital rises by $1 billion. Thus, 
FG measures the payoff of an investment in public capital. Table 1, panel B, reports 
returns calculated for average values of the explanatory variables of the model.15 The 
estimated return to aggregate public capital varies between 14 and 91 percent per 
annum in the cost models and between –34 and 14 percent in the proﬁ  t models.16 The 
estimated return to federal public capital falls between –48 percent and 101 percent 
per annum, while the range for state public capital is wider yet, from −68 to 314 
percent. The proﬁ  t function approach yields most of the estimated negative returns.215 PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC CAPTIAL
 TABLE  1 
 Diagnostics
  A: Likelihood Ratio Test of Signiﬁ  cance of Public Capital in the Modela
 Treatment  NFC  Private  Manufacturing  Services
Model of  Prices  Ab D b A D A D
Cost Observed      17.5 20.7  9.3c 11.3c 18.9c 22.0c
 Instrumented     7.2  8.2  4.4  13.7  14.7c 16.0c
Proﬁ  t  Observed      25.8  33.8  2.0c 4.8c 0.6c 2.8c 
  Instrumented      25.2  27.4 1.9 7.8 7.7 9.9
  B: Estimated Return to (or Marginal Product of) Public Capital
  Treatment  Type of  NFC Private  Manufacturing  Services
Model  of Prices  Public Capital  FG (St.dev.) FG (St.dev.) FG (St.dev.)
Cost Observed  Aggregate  48  (10)  14  (6)  32  (14)
  Instrumented  Aggregate  79 (26) 22 (11) 91 (29)
Proﬁ   t  Observed Aggregate  2 (10)   0 (10) 15 (21)
 Instrumented  Aggregate  -34  (28)  -10  (7)  -13  (13)
Cost  Observed Federal 49 (13) 10 (10) 18 (19)
  Instrumented  Federal  101 (68)  6 (21) 63 (39)
Proﬁ   t  Observed Federal  -33 (23)  0 (16) 13 (25)
  Instrumented  Federal -48 (104) -26  (23) -26  (17)
Cost  Observed State  64 (93)  -33 (52)  158  (139)
  Instrumented  State  -68 (378) 104 (117) 474 (343)
Proﬁ   t  Observed  State  407 (190)  29 (103)  23 (172)
  Instrumented  State  314 (857)  18 (125) 206 (636)
Notes: 




. . () =  for the aggregate public capital model and   χ
09 5
2
61 2 5 9
. . () =  for the 
disaggregate public capital model.
b  “A” denotes that the model contains public capital in its aggregate measure; “D” denotes that public 
capital appears in its disaggregate form.
c  One or more of the ﬁ  rst-order serial correlation coefﬁ  cients in either the restricted or unrestricted 
models was set equal to 0.95.
A few more notes about panel B are in order. First, generally, the imprecision in 
these estimates is substantial: for less than half of the estimated returns in panel 
B is the return greater than twice the standard deviation. This stands somewhat in 
contrast with panel A, according to which public capital matters. Still, most often the 
estimated return is positive. Second, in principle, the returns in the various separate 
sectors are to be added together in order to get a measure of beneﬁ  t to the overall 
private sector: one would hope that the ﬁ  rst column is roughly the sum of the second 
and third. However, even when allowing for the uncertainty in the estimated returns, 
the three columns in panel B of Table 1 are not quite consistent with each other. Third, 
cost models with instrumented prices often generate higher returns but proﬁ  t models 
with instrumented prices often yield lower return estimates. In other words, it is not 
clear that endogeneity bias pushes the estimated returns one way or the other.
Table 1 allows us to argue that public capital matters. However, when variables 
are nonstationary, some might also consider differencing the data before estimating 216 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
the relation in order to guard against the possibility of spurious regression [Tatom, 
1991; Hamilton, 1994, 562; Strum and De Haan, 1995; Garcia-Mila, McGuire, and 
Porter, 1996],17 but we view this rather as a useful method to gain insight into short-
run reactions to changes in public capital. In the context of this paper, the process of 
estimating a model in ﬁ  rst differences requires some further explanation. First of all, 
consider a generic equation y=a0+a1x+a2x2. In differenced form, this equation changes 
into Δy=a1Δx+a2(2xΔx); that is, the equation loses its intercept and shows Δx and 2xΔx 
on the right hand side. Applying this to the present situation, recall that both the 
cost and the proﬁ  t function are speciﬁ  ed as translog functions, which are quadratic in 
logarithms, and that the share/ratio equations are formulated as derivatives of these 
translog functions. When the model is estimated in ﬁ  rst difference, each equation 
loses its intercept. However, the intercepts of the share/ratio equations (in levels) 
are still identiﬁ  ed as slopes in the cost/proﬁ  t equation. Moreover, when speciﬁ  ed in 
ﬁ  rst difference, the cost and proﬁ  t equations contain products of level and ﬁ  rst dif-
ference terms as a consequence of the quadratic terms in the translog form. For the 


















where the second equality of the ﬁ  rst line follows from the symmetry of Γ. Thus, where 
the levels model speciﬁ  es (ln pL)2, the difference model contains 2(ln pL)Δln pL, and 
crossproduct terms like (ln pL) (ln pQ) are replaced by (ln pL)Δln pQ+ (ln pQ)Δln pL.
The diagnostics of models with differenced data are summarized in Table 2. Panel 
A of Table 2 presents the results of cointegration tests on the residuals of various 
models.18 For cost models, the hypothesis of nonstationary residuals is rejected, and 
for proﬁ  t models this hypothesis is in doubt.19 Panel B shows that in more than half 
of the cases the likelihood ratio test fails to show that public capital matters.
The estimated returns to public capital take on both positive and negative values 
that are large and unreasonable (panel C). Since the standard errors of the returns 
to public capital are also very high, the returns are actually not statistically differ-
ent from 0. What is the economic meaning of this? A difference model presumes that 
a current change in the stock of public capital has a current (same-year, short-run) 
impact on the productive activity of the private sector. Given the length of the plan-
ning-and-investment period, it is not surprising that public capital has no impact 
on the private sector in the short run. In this sense, Table 2 conﬁ  rms a reasonable a 
priori notion about the impact of public capital – although it would have been more 
reassuring if panel C would have shown small and insigniﬁ  cant values.217 PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC CAPTIAL
 TABLE  2
  Diagnostics of Models with Differenced Data
  A: Unit Root Tests: Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock ADF, Phillips-Ouliaris Zρ and Zt, and ACFa
 Treatment  Tested  NFC  Private  Manufacturing  Services
Model of  Prices  Equation  Ab D b A  D A  D
Cost Instrumented ∆(lnC) Sss0  Sss0 Sss0  Sss0  SsSA  SsSU
   ∆(σL) SSS0  SSS0  SSS0  SSS0  SSSA  SSSU
   ∆(σQ) SSS0  SSS0  SSS0  SSS0  SSSA  SSSU
Proﬁ  t  Instrumented  ∆(lnΠ) SUU0  SUU0  sUU0  sUU0  SUU0  UUU0
   ∆(-sL) SSS0  SSS0  Sss0  SUU0  SUUA  UUUA
   ∆(-sQ) SSS0  SSS0  ssU0  SUU0  SUU0  sUU0 
  B: Likelihood Ratio Test of Signiﬁ  cance of Public Capital in the Modelc
 Treatment    NFC  Private  Manufacturing  Services
Model of  Prices    A  D  A  D  A  D
Cost Instrumented    6.0  10.2  2.1  5.3  13.2  13.4
Proﬁ  t  Instrumented    1.1  14.2  4.4  13.3  10.4  11.7
  C: Estimated Return to (or Marginal Product of) Public Capital
  Treatment  Type of  NFC Private  Manufacturing  Services
Model  of Prices  Public Capital  FG (St.dev.) FG (St.dev.)  FG (St.dev.)
Cost Instrumented  Aggregate  161  (93)  44  (34)  -1142  (2732)
Proﬁ   t  Instrumented  Aggregate -74  (71)  -30 (15) -43 (14)
Cost Instrumented  Federal  301  (166)  114  (55)  -1240  (3801)
Proﬁ   t  Instrumented  Federal  -40  (87)  -26 (17) -53 (26)
Cost Instrumented  State  -1055  (966)  -466  (457)  -3410 (12073)
Proﬁ   t  Instrumented  State  -344  (590)  -49 (118)  81 (233)
Notes: 
a  Each cell in Panel A contains four indicators of unit root tests, associated with the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test as modiﬁ  ed by Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock [1996], the Zρ and Zt tests of Phillips and Ouliaris 
[1990], and an evaluation of the autocorrelation function, respectively. For the ﬁ  rst three, “U” denotes 
that the hypothesis that a unit root is present in the residual under test is not rejected, while “S” and 
“s” indicates stationarity (rejection of the unit root hypothesis) at a 5 and 10 percent signiﬁ  cance level, 
respectively. For the last element of each cell, which pertains to ACF, “U” denotes evidence of unit 
root behavior in the autocorrelation function, “A” indicates some sort of an ARMA structure, and “0” 
stands for pure white noise.
b  “A” denotes that the model contains public capital in its aggregate measure; “D” denotes that public 
capital appears in its disaggregate form
c  Critical values are  χ
09 5
2 37 8 1
. . () =  for the aggregate (“A”) public capital model and  χ
09 5
2 61 2 5 9
. . () =    
for the disaggregate (“D”) public capital model.
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY EFFECTS, SUBSTITUTION ELASTICITIES, AND 
RETURNS TO SCALE
What do these results say about the degree to which the provision of public capital 
is related to changes in the growth rate of labor productivity in the U.S.? As stated at 
the end of the previous section, public capital has no short-run effect. To understand 218 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
long-run effects, we need to use the instrumented models in their level form, on the 
presumption (i) that cointegration is present and the estimated relationship is not 
spurious, and (ii) that the instrumentation has effectively dealt with the simulta-
neity of prices. Why is it reasonable to proceed in this way? As argued before, the 
cointegration test statistics have low power. Failure to reject the Null hypothesis of 
nonstationarity in the residuals does not make the Null hypothesis true, and there-
fore the alternative hypothesis that cointegration exists is not disproved. Given their 
low power, cointegration tests can prove little statistically;20 therefore, we proceed on 
the grounds that economic theory guides us into the right direction, towards a valid 
model, which in our case is a cost function and a proﬁ  t function model. Estimates of 
the models that use disaggregated public capital are presented in Appendix B.
Panel A of Table 3 shows the average contribution21 of public capital over the pe-
riod 1990-2000, when labor productivity growth accelerated. Focusing on the earlier 
productivity slowdown, Panel B considers the change in contribution from 1960-197322 
to 1976-1989, avoiding the turbulent years of 1974/75 right after the ﬁ  rst oil crisis. 
To put these statistics in context, the observed annual change in labor productivity 
between 1990 and 2000 was 1.92 percent for the private sector, 3.40 percent for the 
manufacturing sector, and 1.02 percent for the service sector. Thus the ﬁ  gure in the 
private sector is roughly a weighted average of the ﬁ  gures of manufacturing and ser-
vice sectors, as we already surmised in the section on Data and Estimation Issues. 
Both the cost function and the proﬁ  t function models predict the total change in labor 
productivity fairly well. To relate this more speciﬁ  cally to Table 3.A, consider the 
nonﬁ  nancial corporate (nfc) private sector. While, as mentioned, labor productivity 
rose by 1.92 percent per year, the cost function model with aggregate public capital 
predicts a 2.17 percent rise (not shown in the table). This consists of 0.20 percent due 
to changes in the capital labor ratio K/L, −0.41 percent due to the changing size of 
the work force L, and 2.25 percent change in multifactor productivity, of which 2.11 
percent comes from the increasing provision of public capital and 0.14 percent from 
technological growth as measured by the time trend. For brevity’s sake, only the 
values of 2.25 and 2.11 are reported in Table 3.
According to Table 3.A, all but one of the cost approach estimates suggest that 
public capital raises private sector productivity; however, the proﬁ  t approach estimates 
for total and federal public capital indicate the opposite result. But the estimates are 
noisy. In fact, none of the proﬁ  t approach estimates exceeds twice the standard er-
ror. Under the cost function approach, all of the estimates for aggregate capital are 
positive and statistically signiﬁ  cantly different from zero.23
Given the concurrent decline in both public capital provision and private sector 
productivity in the 1970’s, can we assert that the productivity decline is caused by 
the reduction in public capital investment? Table 3.B addresses this question. The 
observed difference in the average annual labor productivity growth between 1960-
1973 and 1976-1989 was −1.27 percent for the private sector, 0.21 percent for the 
manufacturing sector, and −0.63 percent for the service sector. The predicted differ-
ences range from −0.62 to −1.48, −0.37 to 0.66, and −1.81 to 0.31 percent for the three 
sectors respectively (not shown in Table 3.B). There are indications that total factor 
productivity went down and that aggregate public capital had something to do with 219 PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC CAPTIAL
it (second and third columns of Table 3.B), a further decomposition becomes murkier. 
With the switching signs and quite large standard errors, there is not enough sup-
port for the notion that the declining provision of public capital since the 1970s has 
contributed to the decline in labor productivity growth.
 TABLE  3
  Effect of Public Capital on Labor Productivitya
  A: Average Predicted Annual Effect on Labor Productivity, 1990-2000
Sector Obs.b  ∆MFP  ∆G  ∆MFP  ∆Gf  ∆Gs
Cost function approach (Instrumented Prices)
NFC Private  1.92  2.25  2.11  2.12  -0.01  2.04
   (0.33)  (0.69)  (0.34)  (1.08)  (1.30)
Manufacturing  3.40 3.31 1.75 3.18 0.51  0.94
   (0.38)  (0.85)  (0.36)  (1.04)  (1.25)
Services  1.02 2.38 2.87 2.35 2.23  2.35
   (0.38)  (0.96)  (0.38)  (1.59)  (1.27)
Proﬁ  t function approach (Instrumented Prices)
NFC Private  1.92  1.59  -3.17  1.65  -2.91  2.27 
   (0.30)  (2.57)  (0.33)  (7.31)  (8.01)
Manufacturing 3.40  2.49  -1.51  2.06  -2.56  -0.12 
   (0.29)  (1.21)  (0.39)  (1.44)  (1.81)
Services 1.02  1.47  -0.50  1.53  -0.95  1.08 
   (0.09)  (0.59)  (0.17)  (0.81)  (3.06)
   B: Difference in the Average Annual Effect on Labor Productivity between 1960-1973 and 1976-1989
Sector Obs.b  ∆MFP  ∆G  ∆MFP  ∆Gf  ∆Gs
Cost function approach (Instrumented Prices)
NFC Private  -1.27  -1.40  -1.79  -0.94  0.59  -2.06 
   (0.53)  (0.83)  (0.63)  (1.76)  (1.88)
Manufacturing  0.21 -0.51 -0.87 -0.85 -2.17 1.17 
   (0.47)  (0.76)  (0.53)  (1.03)  (0.92)
Services  -0.63 -1.55 -1.47 -1.87 -1.62 0.13 
   (0.68)  (0.77)  (1.35)  (1.23)  (0.29)
Proﬁ  t function approach (Instrumented Prices)
NFC  Private  -1.27 -0.41 -3.29 -0.77 -0.30  -0.53 
   (3.92)  (4.92)  (0.59)  (1.69)  (3.36)
Manufacturing 0.21  -0.23  -0.20  0.17  2.90  -2.54 
   (0.34)  (0.64)  (0.66)  (1.44)  (0.80)
Services  -0.63 0.26 1.04 0.30 1.34  0.07 
   (0.29)  (0.41)  (0.75)  (1.06)  (0.48)
Notes: 
a  Standard deviations in parentheses.
b Observed  value
It should be noted that the cost and proﬁ  t models are not designed to, speciﬁ  cally, 
explain trends in labor productivity growth. Even if duality theory tells us that the 
parameters of the cost and proﬁ  t models are intimately related to the structure of 
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the sample and when comparing parts of the sample is rather remarkable. These are 
fairly demanding diagnostic checks on the quality of the empirical model, and these 
models hold up well. It is in the decomposition that the models fail to indicate whether 
public capital has had an impact on labor productivity growth. This is symptomatic, 
and a consequence, of a high degree of multicollinearity in the data.
Another implication of interest concerns the implied Allen partial elasticity of 
substitution among the various inputs. Because public capital is a ﬁ  xed input, the 
elasticities are nonstandard expressions derived from the cost and proﬁ  t functions. 
Formulae are found in Appendix C and are evaluated at the variables’ mean value. 
While the estimated elasticities lack precision and thus should be interpreted with 
caution, Table 4 suggests that (i) state and federal public capital are substitutes for 
each other; and (ii) labor is a substitute for public capital; and (iii) private capital is 
a substitute for federal public capital (and for private labor). In other words, increas-
ing the provision of federal capital relieves the burden of the states, costs jobs, and 
crowds out private investment.
 TABLE  4
  Estimated Elasticities of Substitutiona
  Cost Function Approach  Proﬁ  t Function Approach 
Elasticity  NFC Private  Manufacturing  Services  NFC Private Manufacturing  Services
Aggregated Public Capital Model
eLK  0.72 0.82 0.55  0.18 2.38 0.17
  (0.16) (0.27) (1.37)  (0.44) (9.76) (0.21)
eLG  -0.00  -0.00  -0.00  0.01 1.22 0.05
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (0.02) (4.81) (0.09)
eKG  0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.27  9.25 -1.04
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)  (1.06)  (34.99) (0.74)
Disaggregated Public Capital Model
eLK  -10.65 2.15  -2.85  0.70 0.35  -0.83
 (52.70)  (2.68)  (6.59)  (0.89)  b (9.34)
eLGf  0.24  -0.17 0.49  0.21 0.03 0.75
  (0.62) (2.53) (0.53)  (0.90)  (82.20) (7.15)
eLGs  -6.69 1.61 0.74  0.43 0.08 1.55
 (39.20)  (1.27)  (0.52)  (0.87)  b (8.79)
eKGf  3.28 6.01 4.61  1.87  -0.54 0.10
 (2.94)  (12.72)  (11.82)  (3.81)  b (16.15)
eKGs  34.28 -2.83 -1.55 0.92 -1.56  2.95
  b (6.33)  (12.29)  (2.43)  b (25.98)
eGsGf  1.20  1.18  1.13 0.08 -0.14 -2.31
 (0.07)  (0.08)  (0.04)  (0.91)  b (18.34)
Notes: 
a  Standard deviation in parentheses.
b  Value exceeds 100.
Finally, some of the growth theory literature assumes constant returns to scale in 
capital [Barro, 1991; Rebelo, 1991]. Table 5 shows the estimated percentage growth 
in output when both private and public capital grows by one percent. The returns 
to scale derived from the cost function are close to unity, considering the associated 
standard errors, though effects are smaller in manufacturing and larger in services. 
The proﬁ  t function results are not consistent with a notion of constant returns to 221 PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC CAPTIAL
scale in capital, a result that owes to negative returns to public capital as was already 
shown in Table 1.
 TABLE  5
  Returns to Scale in Capital
  Type of  NFC Private  Manufacturing  Services
Model  Public  Capital  R.t.s  (St.dev.) R.t.s.  (St.dev.) R.t.s.  (St.dev.)
Cost  Aggregate 0.98  (0.27) 0.79  (0.35) 1.43 (0.45)
  Disaggregate  1.00  (0.30) 0.69  (0.35) 1.76 (0.54)
Proﬁ  t  Aggregate  -0.27  (0.29)  -0.20  (0.23)  -0.13  (0.19)
 Disaggregate  0.05  (0.45)  -0.57  (135.83)  0.09  (1.24)
Note:  R.t.s. denotes returns to scale.
CONCLUSION
Just as many other studies before [Gramlich, 1994], we ﬁ  nd a large public capi-
tal effect: estimates of the rate of return range from –48 to 101 percent for federal 
public capital, and from –68 to 314 percent for state public capital. Cost function 
models indicate that investments in public capital enhance labor productivity, but 
proﬁ  t function models fail to ﬁ  nd an effect that is positive and statistically different 
from 0. As a result, cost function models (but not proﬁ  t function models) suggest that 
declining investments in public capital caused at least a portion of the slowdown in 
labor productivity growth in the 1970s; however, these results are not clear about the 
relative importance of federal or state public capital in this. We also estimate Allen 
partial elasticities of substitution (which, due to the ﬁ  xed nature of public capital, are 
nonstandard expressions): they imply that the provision of federal capital substitutes 
for efforts by the states, costs jobs, and crowds out private investment. Finally, cost 
function (but not proﬁ  t function) results uphold the notion of constant returns to scale 
in capital, as sometimes assumed in the growth literature.
Since cost and proﬁ  t function results differ, should one set of results perhaps be 
preferred over the other? A cost function is closely related to the physical process of 
production. In principle, proﬁ  ts also depend on the demand characteristics and the 
structure of the output market, but to account for the endogeneity of output, note 
that the empirical implementation of the proﬁ  t function model assumes competitive 
output markets, as does the cost function model. There are therefore no theoretical 
grounds for preferring one model to the other. But there is one practical argument: 
since proﬁ  t is the difference between revenue and cost and therefore is impacted by 
random disturbances in both variables, the proﬁ  t variable may be noisier than the 
cost variable. If so, the proﬁ  t function estimates would be less reliable than those of 
the cost function. The cost function model does indeed yield more plausible results. 
Some may view this as a strong enough foundation for ﬁ  rm conclusions and rigorous 
policy recommendations; we would like to see conﬁ  rmation in further research.
Moreover, these results represent point estimates only and should be treated with 
great caution. Whereas other studies did not quantify the precision of their estimate, 
we ﬁ  nd that there is a high degree of uncertainty in the exact magnitude of these ﬁ  nd-
ings. We examine the issue by means of several data sets that cover a longer period 
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to the endogeneity of prices, and a battery of diagnostic tests. Statistically, public 
capital matters as effects are different from zero; economically, the estimates are not 
particularly robust, primarily due to a high degree of multicollinearity in the data. 
Therefore, echoing Vijverberg, Vijverberg and Gamble [1997], our estimates suggest 
that it will be difﬁ  cult to arrive at a consensus about the effect of public capital on 
the basis of this line of research on time series data. 
One standard solution to multicollinearity is to collect more data, especially data 
of a different nature. In principle, utilizing sectoral data is an implementation of 
this strategy. Moreover, one might argue that the manufacturing and service sectors 
should not be aggregated since they are governed by different production processes, 
thus biasing any aggregative analysis. But while sectoral analysis could have led to 
a different outcome, in the end the conclusion is unchanged. It may still be beneﬁ  cial 
to build data sets with more variation in the explanatory variables, such as cross-
region/state or cross-industry panel data, or to investigate the contribution of the 
various components of public capital [Garcia-Mila, McGuire and Porter, 1996; Fernald 
,1999; Demetriades and Mamuneas, 2000; Rovolis and Spence, 2002]. One might note 
as well that studies in this ﬁ  eld, like ours, incorporate one speciﬁ  c external factor, 
which is public capital, while ignoring so many others that may also have an impact, 
such as regulation, environmental concerns, globalization, computer technology, and 
changing labor force demographics.24 Even so, to measure the impact of public capital 
on productive activities is clearly important: because of its policy potential, the issue 
should still hold the profession’s attention. 
 APPENDIX  A
 DATA  SOURCES
The following sources are used to compile the data, with the acronyms to be used 
below:
BCD:  Business Conditions Digest. Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. De-
partment of Commerce, Washington, D.C. August 1988.
ER:   Economic Report of the President. U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁ  ce. 
Washington, D.C. 1995, 2000 (w3.access.gpo.gov/eop/).
BLS:  Bureau of Labor Statistics (www.bls.gov/data/home.htm)
BEA: Fixed  Assets  Tables; Bureau of Economic Analysis (www.bea.doc.
gov/bea/dn/faweb). For more information, see also Katz and Herman [1997].
RR:    Romer and Romer [1990; 1994].
The data are annual and cover the period from 1959 through 2000 for the nonﬁ  -
nancial corporate private sector data and for the manufacturing sector, and 1965 to 
2000 for the service sector. The service sector consists of wholesale trade, retail trade, 
and ‘services’ as ofﬁ  cially deﬁ  ned as a separate category. As discussed in the section 
on Data and Estimation Issues, the usually included subsectors of ﬁ  nance, insurance, 
and real estate are omitted.
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Private sector: deﬁ  ned as the constant (1996) dollar value of corporate nonﬁ  nancial 
GDP [ER, 2002, B-14] divided by output per hour of all employees in 1996 dollars. 
The latter is computed from the 1987 value given in [ER, 1995, B-14], transformed to 
1996 prices with the variable pQ given below, and computed for other years by means 
of information on the percentage change in output per hour in the nonfarm business 
sector [ER, 2002, B-50]. Manufacturing: hours worked by production workers, deﬁ  ned 
as (production-worker average weekly hours + production-worker average weekly 
overtime hours) * 52 weeks * total number of production workers [BLS]. Services: 
hours worked by production workers, deﬁ  ned as production-worker average weekly 
hours * 52 weeks * total number of production workers [BLS].
•  pL = compensation per hour of work in current dollars.
Private sector: series from 1959 to 1993 [ER, 1995, B-14], extended by means of 
changes in the total compensation cost index covering the entire private sector [ER, 
2002, B-48]. Manufacturing: average hourly earnings in current dollars of production 
workers [BLS], multiplied with the ratio of total compensation in the nonﬁ  nancial 
private sector over wages in the private nonagricultural industries [ER, 2002, B-47]. 
Services: average hourly earnings of production workers [BLS], multiplied with the 
ratio of total compensation in the nonﬁ  nancial private sector over wages in the private 
nonagricultural industries [ER, 2002, B-47].
•  K = constant (1996) dollar net stock of capital.
Private sector: corporate nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  xed nonresidential private capital (equip-
ment and structures). [BEA, Tables 4.1; 4.2]. Manufacturing and services: ﬁ  xed 
nonresidential private capital (durable and nondurable goods). [BEA, Tables 3.1ES; 
3.2ES].
•  pK = qK(r + d) − ΔqK = user cost of capital.
qK is the current nominal price of capital goods, r is the nominal interest rate, d is 
the depreciation rate, and ΔqK is the change in the price of capital goods. qK  is the ratio 
of the current to constant (1996) dollar net stock of capital as deﬁ  ned above. [BEA: 
Current value: private sector: Tables 4.1; manufacturing and services: Tables 3.1ES]. 
r is Moody’s Aaa corporate bond rate [ER, 2002, B-73]. d is measured for all three 
samples as the current dollar value of the capital consumption allowance divided by 
the current dollar value of the net stock of corporate nonﬁ  nancial ﬁ  xed nonresidential 
private capital (equipment and structures). [ER, 2002, B-14; BEA, Table 4.1]. In two 
cases where pK turned out to be a tiny negative value, it was arbitrarily set equal 
to 0.005 which was smaller than the smallest positive value in the remainder of the 
three datasets.
•  Q = constant (1996) dollar value of output.224 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
Private sector: GDP of nonﬁ  nancial corporate business [ER, 2002, B-15]. Manu-
facturing and services: nominal sectoral GDP [ER, 2002, B-12] divided by pQ.
•  pQ = price of output.
Ratio of nominal to real dollar value of output. Private Sector [ER, 2002, B-15]. 
Manufacturing and Services: spliced together from [ER, 1991, B-10; B-11; 1999, B-
12; B-13; 2002, B-12; B-13]; see footnote 4 in the section on Data and Estimation 
Issues.
•  Gf = federal public capital.
Constant dollar net stock of federal, nonmilitary government-owned ﬁ  xed capital 
(equipment and structures) in 1996 dollars. [BEA, Tables 7.1; 7.2].
•  Gs = state public capital.
Constant dollar net stock of state and local government-owned ﬁ  xed capital (equip-
ment and structures) in 1996 dollars. [BEA, Table 7.1 and 7.2].
•  G = public capital, deﬁ  ned as Gf + Gs
•  t = linear time trend, starting with 1 in the ﬁ  rst year of the sample.
The following are used as instruments:
•  Federal Funds Rate [ER, 2002, B-73].
•  Exports: constant dollar U.S. exports [ER, 2002, B-6].
•  Defense Expenditures: constant dollar federal government purchases of goods 
and services for national defense [ER, 2002, B-6].
•  Romer dates: dates at which monetary policy changed into a substantially 
more restrictive stance: December 1968, April 1994, August 1978, October 1979, and 
December 1988. To annualize, we assume an exponential decay of the shock with a 
95 percent rate of completion after seven months [RR].
 APPENDIX  B
  ESTIMATES OF MODELS WITH DISAGGREGATE PUBLIC CAPITAL
  AND INSTRUMENTED PRICES
Table A1 and A2 present estimates of the cost and proﬁ  t function models speci-
ﬁ  ed with disaggregate public capital and instrumented prices. Likelihood ratio test 
statistics should be compared with a  χ
00 5
2 61 2 5 9
. . () = critical value: public capital enters 225 PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC CAPTIAL
in a statistically signiﬁ  cant way only in the cost function model of the manufacturing 
and service sectors and the proﬁ  t function model of the nfc private sector.
 TABLE  A1
  FIML Estimates of the Cost Function Model with 
  Disaggregated Public Capital
Sector NFC  Private  Manufacturing  Services 
Parameters of the σL-equation:
Intercept  -0.699 (0.50)  0.281 (0.62)  -0.555 (0.35)
lnpL-lnpK  0.093 (7.16)  0.091 (7.54)  0.031 (4.40)
lnQ  0.166 (8.87)  0.114 (4.16)  0.067 (4.57)
lnGf  0.195 (0.49)  0.097 (0.89)  0.108 (0.56)
lnGs  -0.280 (0.80)  -0.235 (1.72)  0.023 (0.10)
t*100  -0.697  (1.34) -0.410  (1.88) -0.705  (1.14)
ρL  0.731 (5.71)  0.313 (1.88)  0.950b
Parameters of the σQ-equation:
Intercept  -1.732 (0.89)  5.255 (3.45)  1.378 (0.57)
lnpL-lnpK  0.166a   0.114a   0.067a
lnQ  0.233 (1.89)  -0.105 (0.69)  0.405 (2.44)
lnGf    0.234 (0.49)  -0.988 (2.70)  -0.444 (1.98)
lnGs  -0.220 (0.51)  0.610 (1.41)  0.072 (0.18)
t*100  -1.155 (1.50)  1.771 (2.46)  -1.069 (1.07)
ρQ  0.647 (5.88)  0.582 (4.14)  0.693 (7.73)
Remaining parameters of the log-cost equation:
Intercept  20.201 (0.81)  -25.747 (2.12)  4.607 (0.18)
lnGf  -3.942 (0.63)  5.946 (1.94)  1.506 (0.57)
lnGs  3.231 (0.61)  -3.441 (0.98)  -1.992 (0.46)
t*100  13.145 (1.40)  -10.465 (1.79) 14.595 (1.39)
t2*100  -0.006 (0.11)  -0.071 (1.35)  0.016 (0.28)
ρC  0.591 (4.94)  0.593 (3.42)  0.713 (6.70)
Covariance matrix:
ΣLL*1000  0.448 (4.11)  0.262 (4.48)  0.172 (4.08)
ΣQQ*1000  1.239 (4.10)  1.263 (4.50)  0.461 (4.12)
ΣCC*1000  2.115  (4.26) 2.225  (4.50) 1.903  (4.13)
ρLQ  0.920  (33.55) 0.680  (7.95) 0.823  (14.21)
ρLC  -0.775  (11.06) -0.185  (1.04) -0.426  (3.00)
ρQC  -0.763 (9.72)  -0.257 (1.39)  -0.514 (3.46)
Log-Likelihood 305.067  270.706  279.340
Likelihood ratio testc 8.186  13.723  16.032 
Notes: The absolute values of asymptotic t-scores are in parentheses.
a  Parameter is subject to cross-equation parameter restrictions.
b  Restricted to a maximal value of 0.95 to ensure convergence.
c  Testing the joint signiﬁ  cance of public capital parameters. The critical value is  χ
09 5
2
61 2 5 9
. . () =  . 
 APPENDIX  C
  DERIVING ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION AND RETURNS
Deﬁ  ne the Allen partial elasticity of substitution as  () ( ) ij ij k k i j k HF X H X X θ = ∑ , 
where H is the determinant of the bordered Hessian matrix of the production func-
tion F, Hij is the cofactor associated with Fij, and X is the input vector consisting of L, 
K, Gf, and Gs. This appendix presents the formulae needed to extract values for the 
production function derivatives Fij from the dual functions C and Π. This procedure 
is nonstandard since Gf and Gs are treated as ﬁ  xed inputs.226 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 TABLE  A2
  FIML Estimates of the Proﬁ  t Function Model with 
  Disaggregated Public Capital
Sector NFC  Private  Manufacturing  Services 
Parameters of the sQ-equation:
Intercept  -40.891 (0.61) 18.940 (1.52)  2.033 (0.05)
lnpQ-lnpK  -8.778 (0.42) -5.442  (6.18) -6.719  (5.12)
lnpL-lnpK  6.934  (0.40) 5.205  (6.11) 6.499  (4.92)
lnGf  7.531 (0.35)  0.434 (0.21)  -0.450 (0.16)
lnGs  -3.485 (0.11)  1.473 (0.86)  -2.342 (0.57)
t -0.342  (0.83)  -0.187  (3.18)    0.009  (0.06)
ρQ 0.382  (1.42)  0.950a    0.730  (4.78)
Parameters of the (-sL)-equation:
Intercept  22.045 (0.49) 14.639 (1.54)  0.309 (0.01)
lnpQ-lnpK 6.934b   5.205b   6.499b
lnpL-lnpK  -5.744 (0.35) -5.145  (6.06) -6.363  (4.79)
lnGf  -3.858 (0.27)  -0.501 (0.29)  0.462 (0.20)
lnGs  2.256 (0.11)  -0.275 (0.20)  2.078 (0.63)
t  0.222 (0.76)  0.160 (3.52)  -0.002 (0.02)
ρL  0.382c   0.950c   0.730c
Remaining parameters of the log-proﬁ  t equation:
Intercept  8.764 (0.12) 12.699 (0.72) 29.415 (0.54)
lnGf  -1.200 (0.07) -1.215  (0.31) -2.646  (0.53)
lnGs  0.183 (0.01)  -1.745 (0.51)  -4.099 (0.95)
t  -0.083 (0.27)  -0.125 (1.35)  0.072 (0.34)
t2*100  -0.666 (0.53) -0.506  (3.66) -0.108  (1.59)
ρΠ 0.373  (1.35)  0.951  (18.48)    0.478  (2.62)
Covariance matrix:
ΣQQ  55.819  (4.55) 0.051  (4.28) 0.011  (3.94)
ΣLL  25.522  (4.56) 0.022  (4.25) 0.006  (4.06)
ΣΠΠ  0.113  (4.08) 0.006  (3.97) 0.002  (4.00)
ρQL  -0.999  d -0.975  d -0.970  (90.26)
ρQΠ  -0.934  (36.84) -0.839  (14.75) -0.781  (9.44)
ρLΠ  0.931  (34.42) 0.811  (12.50) 0.823  (12.86)
Log-Likelihood -58.646  157.526  205.731
Likelihood ratio teste 27.434  7.806  9.943 
Notes: The absolute values of asymptotic t-scores are in parentheses.
a  Restricted to a maximal value of 0.95 to ensure convergence
b  Parameter is subject to cross-equation parameter restrictions.
c  Restricted in order to preserve the adding-up constraint.
d  t-score exceeds 100. 
e  Testing the joint signiﬁ  cance of public capital parameters. The critical value is   χ
09 5
2
61 2 5 9
. . () = .
To simplify the formulae under the cost function approach, deﬁ  ne I=(LK)´ as the 
variable input vector and  () LK wp p ′ =  as its price vector. Let  () fs GG G ′ = . Thus, 
() XI G ′′ ′ = . The cost function  (,) CwQ is found by minimizing Cw I ′ =  subject 
to the restriction (, ) QF I G = . Let λ  be the Lagrange multiplier of the restriction. 
The input demand functions are stated in general terms as  (,,) II w G Q = , with its 
derivatives derived in standard ways from the ﬁ  rst order conditions of minimization; 
the expressions contain second order derivatives of the production function multiplied 
with λ. If the cost function is ﬁ  rst speciﬁ  ed, one has the result  w CwC I ∂∂ = = . Thus, 
the derivatives of the input demand functions depend on second-order derivatives of 
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where 
2
ww CC w w ′ =∂ ∂ ∂ , etc. Furthermore,  GG Q FC C =− ,  IQ Fw C = , and, in a 
competitive economy,  QQ Cp λ == . With this information, the elasticities of substi-
tution can be computed.
To simplify the formulae needed under the proﬁ  t function approach, deﬁ  ne 
() IL K ′ =  and  () LK wp p ′ = . The dual proﬁ  t function is stated in general terms 
as  () ,,, Q pw G t Π=Π , which is the outcome of the maximization of  Q pQ w I ′ Π= − , 
subject to the restriction  () ,, QF I G t = . Similar to above, the derivatives of the 
input demand functions can be stated in terms of second order derivatives of F as 
well as Π. Thus,
  w I =− Π
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IG ww wG Q Fp
− =− Π Π
  ()
1
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− ′ =Π − Π Π Π
Second-level subscripts on pQ  are omitted.
The return to investments in public capital is given by FG; the expressions have 
already been used above.
 NOTES
  We gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments of an anonymous referee.
1.  With a panel of industry data and a completely different empirical model, Fernald [1999] illustrates 
the contribution of road-building in the 1950s and 1960s.
2.  Morrison and Schwarz [1996] found that investment in public (infrastructure) capital lowers costs 
in the manufacturing sector but also that the rate of return net of the cost of investment is close to 
zero.
3.  Unlike Lynde and Richmond [1993] and Vijverberg, Vijverberg, and Gamble [1997], we do not consider 
material inputs here, as sectoral data on material inputs do not exist. The latter study, which used 
aggregate data, did not indicate that raw materials had an important effect.228 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
4.  The intuition behind this result is that an increase in G raises output by an amount of FG. Under cost 
minimization, the ﬁ  rm aims for an output target Q. The increase in G therefore allows the ﬁ  rm to 
reduce its use of inputs equal to the value of the output generated by dG (because of the competitive 
output market assumption).
5.  Consistent with what was mentioned earlier in the text, ΓGG = ΓGt = ΓtG = 0.
6.  Given the short length of the sample (N ranging from 36 to 42) and the number of parameters in the 
lnC equation (12 or 15, and a serial correlation parameter), we actually have little choice but to impose 
the cross-equation parameter restrictions. If the iterative search for parameter estimates converges 
for the unrestricted model, there is still the question by what distribution one would evaluate the 
implied likelihood ratio test statistic, since the sample is so small.
7.  The missing years for the service sector owe to missing information on wages and total hours worked 
in the (ofﬁ  cially denoted) service subsector, which in fact was created as a result of a reorganization of 
data collection methods in the early 1960s. In the late 1980s, SIC codes were changed which may have 
some impact on the continuity of the sectoral data, but implausible discontinuities are not evident. 
The difference in years covered might account for some of the sectoral variation in the estimation 
results.
8.  The 2000 value of (nonﬁ  nancial corporate) private sector output (in 1982 dollars) was $5380.7 billion; 
that of all private sectors combined was $8356.8 billion, of which the manufacturing and service sec-
tor (as deﬁ  ned here) contributed $5299.2 billion; the ﬁ  nance, insurance, and real estate subsectors 
generated another $1936.2 billion. Similarly, consider capital stock values: in 2000, the nonﬁ  nancial 
corporate private sector had a stock (in 1996 dollars) valued at $6804 billion out of a total of $12181 
billion of private sector ﬁ  xed capital; the manufacturing and services sectors had $3914 worth of 
capital, whereas among the other sectors nonresidential real estate took the lion’s share with $3407 
billion and transportation and utilities contributed $2637 billion.
9.  Endogeneity of prices is not incongruous with the perfect competition assumption made in the second 
section: perfect competition relates to the behavior of ﬁ  rms; endogeneity of prices relate to the behavior 
of markets.
10.  The instrumental equations predict quite well, but it should be remembered that in time series models, 
where high R2-values are common, slight variations can be very meaningful. For example, adding 
one variable to a model may raise the R2 from 0.95 to 0.96, which seems to be a trivial improvement 
until one realizes that this one variable explain one ﬁ  fth of the remaining unexplained variation in 
the dependent variable. In the context of the IV technique, the predicted prices remove a small but, 
based on one’s trust in the instrument variables, important endogenous component from the prices 
variables, which can have a substantial impact on the results.
11.  It is a bit surprising that even the labor and output share/ratio variables are found to be nonstationary. 
But recall that in these tests the Null hypothesis posits the existence of a unit root. These kinds of 
test statistics have weak power in short time series when variables are serially correlated but do not 
have a unit root. Thus, as plausible as the notion of stationarity is, there is not enough information 
in the data to reject the base idea of nonstationarity.
12.  We compared the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation functions of the residuals with the 
behavior (under the same sample size) of 100 simulated variables with a unit root and used the least 
unit-root-like behavior as a minimal guideline.
13. A  simpliﬁ  ed model omits the cost or proﬁ  t equation and merely estimates share equations. It turns out 
that the residuals of these share equations also exhibit nonstationarity, contrary to a similar study 
by Lynde and Richmond [1993]. Thus, entering a cost or proﬁ  t equation into the model is not a cause 
for an apparent lack of cointegration.
14.  Tables with the parameter estimates for the instrumented models and disaggregated public capital 
are given in Appendix B. The contribution of public capital is represented by six parameters, estimates 
of which may be individually statistically insigniﬁ  cant even when the group together is statistically 
signiﬁ  cant. A cursory inspection of the parameter estimates reveals that this indeed happens, possibly 
owing to multicollinearity or overparameterization.
15.  We also experimented with a one-period lag on G. Results were similar. It is not a priori clear how 
long the lag should be, if there should be one.
16.  To be sure, the literature has not yet generated a “typical” estimate of returns against which our 
estimates can be compared. Literature using the production function approach [Aschauer, 1989; 
others] suggests a rate of return of up to 100 percent, which is very high indeed [Gramlich, 1994]. 229 PRODUCTIVITY OF PUBLIC CAPTIAL
Morrison and Schwartz [1996] used the cost function approach to estimate the shadow values of 
state infrastructure of manufacturing ﬁ  rms and generated returns ranging from 5.6 percent to 34.9 
percent. Our study corresponds with these results but does not manage to narrow the range. Better 
estimation techniques yield numerically different estimates of the return that, econometrically, should 
be qualitatively superior. The characteristics of the data prevent these estimates from showing up 
qualitatively superior in an economic sense: multicollinearity is so extreme that a more precise esti-
mate of the return to public capital investment remains elusive. At the same time, our public capital 
variable refers to an aggregate, and it may be that one may be able to estimate rates of return more 
precisely for its components [Gramlich, 1994, 1178].
17.  Alternatively, one might wish to formulate an error correction model [Hamilton, 1994, chap. 19], but 
this is not a feasible strategy. An error correction model is a restricted version of a general linear vec-
tor autoregression model, where linear combinations of nonstationary variables are stationary and 
inﬂ  uence the path of each separate nonstationary variable through error correction parameters. An 
error correction model starts with a set of non-stationary variables, presupposes a linear structure, and 
hopes to discover economically meaningful structures. The complexity of a three-equation nonlinear 
model with cross-equation parameter restrictions goes far beyond what the error correction model 
was designed for. Cost and proﬁ  t function models start with a quadratic structure. A non-stationary 
variable integrated of order 1 may become part of a cointegrated linear system, but this same vari-
able squared has radically different statistical properties, making it statistically inconsistent with 
the notion of a cointegrated system in the form that the literature has studied. Finally, an attempt to 
implement an error correction model would presumably add nine error correction parameters to be 
estimated (three for each equation), putting added pressure on the limited amount of data available 
here: with roughly 40 years of data, we already estimate 21 parameters. One might note that the share 
equations are linear and therefore amenable to an error correction estimation strategy [Oniki 2000], 
or that the simplicity of the share equations may make the residuals more appropriate for the ADF, 
Zρ  and  t Z  tests [Lynde and Richmond, 1992; Clark and Youngblood, 1992]. This strategy yields 
estimates of some but not all of the translog model parameters, and it evades the translog structure 
that ties the share equations to the cost or proﬁ  t equation.
18.  Note that differencing a nonstationary variable (say, x ) yields a stationary variable  x Δ  only if  x  
is integrated of order 1. By implication, since the model contains linear, quadratic and interacted 
variables, estimating the model in difference form is not guaranteed to produce a set of stationary 
residuals, as the variation in results for cost and proﬁ  t models demonstrates.
19.  Differenced data elicit short-run effects, but with a lack of cointegration one would still wish to for-
mulate an error correction model. As in footnote 17, that is not a feasible strategy here either.
20. The  cost  function and proﬁ  t function models are highly nonlinear, with many cross-equation parameter 
restrictions implied. Test statistics may be computed but are compared with ﬂ  awed approximations 
to the true underlying distributions.
21.  Mathematically, this is expressed in equations (5) and (8) in the second section.
22.  Or 1965-1973 in case of the service sector, owing to data limitations.
23.  It should be noted that, contrary to the variability of the contribution of public capital and the time 
trend, the implied impacts of changes in the capital/labor ratio and in the size of the labor force are 
nearly identical across the four sets of results for each sector. The impact of the capital/labor ratio 
is 0.17, 0.33 and 0.15 for the nfc private, manufacturing and service sectors respectively; the impact 
of the labor force growth is -0.35, 0.04 and -0.83, respectively. In particular, the last statistic shows 
that the labor productivity growth rate in the service sector has been depressed by the sector’s rapid 
labor force growth.
24.  One might also consider the movement from manufacturing to services production in the economy as a 
factor driving the change in labor productivity. By separately estimating models for the manufacturing 
and service sectors, we in fact control for this factor.
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